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TARASOFF AS A DUTY TO TREAT:
INSIGHTS FROM CRIMINAL LAW
Christopher Slobogin *
INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of its fourth decade the holding in Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California,1 requiring mental health
professionals to take reasonable steps to prevent violence threatened by
their patients, seems to have stood the test of time. When the Tarasoff
decision was first handed down, opponents predicted that the decision
would lead to unwarranted hospitalizations and ineffectual phone calls
to police and victims, at the same time it would increase the public peril
because wary therapists would avoid potentially violent individuals, who
in turn would be reluctant to talk about violent thoughts or to enter
therapy in the first place.2 Empirical research, conducted within the first
decade of Tarasoff's existence, lent some credence to those claims.3 Yet
a recent review concluded that, narrowed down to a requirement that
therapists act on patient threats of serious harm to identified victims, 4 the
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of
Law. This paper was presented at the University of Cincinnati College of Law Symposium on The
Future of the "'Duty to Protect ": Scientific and Legal Perspectives On Tarasoff's Thirtieth Anniversary.
1. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). The California Supreme Court's initial decision in the case is at
529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974), but a rehearing was granted and the holding described in the text is from the
second decision.
2. One of the first, and arguably the best, criticisms of Tarasoff along these lines is found in
Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV.
358 (1976).
3. See David J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law
in Action, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443, 467 (about one-third of surveyed therapists were more willing to
initiate involuntary hospitalization after Tarasoj)); Toni Pryor Wise, Note, Where the Public Peril
Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165, 177
nn.67, 86, & 181 (1978) (finding that, post-Tarasoff, nearly 25% of therapists noted patients' increased
reluctance to discuss violent thoughts and a small minority rejected patients considered dangerous);
David L. Rosenhan et al., Warning Third Parties: The Ripple Effects of Tarasoff, 24 PAC. L. J. 1165,
1214 nn. 245, 1215 table 10 (1993) (60% of therapists surveyed felt that patients were at least
"somewhat" more reluctant to divulge sensitive information, 26.3% reported they had lost patients who
were informed of the Tarasoff requirement "at the outset of therapy", and 50.2% reported losing patients
who made a threat and were told of the possible need to breach confidentiality).
4. Most states today only impose "Tarasoff liability" if the victim is identified or identifiable.
See Allison L. Almason, Comment, Personal Liability Implications of the Duty to Warn are Hard Pills
to Swallow: From Tarasoff to Hutchinson v. Patel and Beyond, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
471, 478 n. 47 (1997). A few courts reject these limitations. See, e.g., Hamman v. County of Maricopa,
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Tarasoff duty "might hold more potential for good than once was
believed.",5  Numerous other commentators have also concluded that
Tarasoff isn't so bad after all.6 Even those who initially vehemently
criticized Tarasoff have backed off from that position.7
That conclusion does not mean that Tarasoff is without flaws, of
course. At the margins, the Tarasoff rule undoubtedly leads to
unnecessary breaches of confidentiality and hospital commitments,
reticence about taking on problem patients, more tension between doctor
and patient because of an increased focus on dangerousness, and more
stress among therapists who know they are not particularly good at
assessing risk. We also do not really know the answer to the key policy
question underlying Tarasoff: whether the duty announced in that case
reduces the number of serious violent incidents by patients, when
compared to a regime where ethics and sound treatment practices, rather
than civil liability, provide the primary incentive to prevent harm.8 For
these types of reasons, many jurisdictions have rejected Tarasoff.9 At
best, we can only say that, in those jurisdictions where it applies, and
probably even in those jurisdictions where it does not, the Tarasoff rule
has made therapists more careful in their treatment of potentially violent
individuals. 10
775 P.2d 1122, 1128 (Ariz. 1989); Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 166 (Wis. 1988).
5. See Brian Ginsburg, Tarasoff at Thirty. Victim's Knowledge Shrinks the Psychotherapist's
Duty to Warn and Protect, 21 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2004).
6. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Implications of Tarasofffor Clinical Practice, in THE POTENTIALLY
VIOLENT PATIENT AND THE TARASOFF DECISION IN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 94 (James Beck ed., 1985)
("[C]linicians have learned to live with Tarasoff, recognizing that good common sense, sound clinical
practice, careful documentation, and a genuine concern for their patients, are almost always sufficient to
fulfill their legal obligations."); Lawson R. Wulsin et al., Unexpected Clinical Features of the Tarasoff
Decision: The Therapeutic Alliance and the "Duty to Warn, " 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 601 (1983)
(reporting instances where warnings have furthered the therapeutic alliance and contributed to a
patient's progress in therapy); James S. Beck, When a Patient Threatens Violence: An Empirical Study
of Clinical Practice After Tarasoff, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 189, 199 (1982) (finding
that Tarasoff "seldom had an adverse effect on the therapeutic relationship" if warnings requirement is
discussed openly with patient).
7. See ALAN A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 181 (1984) ("the duty to warn is
not as unmitigated a disaster for the enterprise of psychotherapy as it once seemed to critics like
myself.").
8. Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: New Directions for
the 1990's, 16 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 60 (1992) ("there is no reliable database of empirical evidence
as to the therapeutic value of Tarasoffwarnings or of the case's ultimate 'real life' impact.").
9. See, e.g., Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Tex. 1999); Gregory v. Kilbride, 565
S.E.2d 685, 692 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Nasser v. Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502, 506 (Va. 1995); Boynton v.
Burglass, 590 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991).
10. Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, "Where the Public Peril Begins" 25 Years After
Tarasoff, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 187, 214 (2000) ("Ultimately, Tarasoff has stimulated greater awareness of
the violent patient's potential for acting out such behavior, encouraging closer scrutiny and better
documentation of the therapist's examination of this issue.").
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The purpose of this paper is not to rehash these issues, all of which
have been diligently discussed.' 1 Rather, the focus here will be an
analysis of Tarasoff's potential impact outside of tort law and on groups
other than the mental health profession. That focus raises questions
about the case that, despite the voluminous commentary about it, have
not been raised before, or at least not as explicitly.
The main vehicle for carrying out this project will be the criminal
law. A good case can be made for the proposition that a breach of the
Tarasoff duty, as defined today, should lead to criminal, as well as civil,
liability, not just for something minor like a failure to report a potential
crime, but for the felony committed by the patient. A somewhat weaker
argument can be made that this criminal liability should extend beyond
mental health professionals to other professionals, such as lawyers, and
to the public at large. It is in exploring whether these assertions are
sustainable that I hope to expose some important, heretofore little
noticed, features of the Tarasoff duty and suggest some limitations on it.
The ultimate conclusion one might reach based on this way of looking
at Tarasoff is that, if some type of duty regarding dangerous people is to
be imposed on mental health professionals-as distinguished from the
rest of society-it should be conceptualized as a duty to treat
dangerousness, not as an omnibus duty to prevent harm to third parties.
As a practical matter, this duty would most likely result in liability (civil
and criminal) when a mental health professional: (1) knows that a
patient has threatened an identified person with serious bodily harm; (2)
knows that the patient has engaged in conduct aimed at achieving that
end; and (3) fails to commit or otherwise treat the patient in a manner
calculated to alleviate the danger. In short, a mental health professional
in a Tarasoff situation should have a duty to treat but should never have
a duty to warn the potential victim or call the police, unless we are also
prepared to make non-clinicians equally liable, civilly and criminally,
for failing to take such steps under the same conditions.
I. TARASOFF'S RELATIONSHIP TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY
To my knowledge, no jurisdiction has criminally prosecuted a mental
health professional for a violation of Tarasoff That does not mean such
prosecutions would be inappropriate under all circumstances, however.
A clinician who breaches Tarasoff might easily be found criminally
liable under current doctrine, especially if a violation of Tarasoff is
11. In addition to the articles cited in the previous notes, see Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff,
58 ALB. L. REV. 97 (1994); Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient:
Implications ofTarasofffor Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263 (1982).
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 647 2006-2007
648 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LA WREVIEW [Vol.75
defined as a failure to take preventive steps after a patient has threatened
serious bodily harm to an identifiable victim.
In criminal law, as well as tort law, there is no general duty to rescue
people from trouble, much less prevent it. 12 Thus, it is usually not a
crime to watch a person drown, or to fail to alert a potential victim that
someone is intent on killing them. As described in more detail below, in
most jurisdictions even failure to report a crime one has observed is not
a crime.
However, it is well-established that a failure to act can form the
predicate for criminal liability if the failure constitutes a violation of a
recognized legal duty.13  That duty can be created by relationship,
statute, caselaw, or contract. 14  Thus, a lifeguard may be guilty of
manslaughter if he or she fails to save a drowning person, and parents
and guardians can be guilty of homicide if they neglect to feed children
in their care. 15  More relevant to the present discussion, parents and
employers have been found criminally liable, even for homicide, when
they did not protect third parties from their children and employees,
respectively.
16
The Tarasoff decision imposes the same type of duty on mental health
professionals toward third parties threatened by their patients. 17
Accordingly, a breach of that duty that causes a death constitutes the
actus reus for homicide. Similarly, a breach of the duty that causes
serious bodily harm would be sufficient actus reus for an aggravated
assault charge.
Proof of actus reus is not enough for conviction, of course. A
criminal mens rea must also be proven.' 8  And because criminal
punishment is based on an assessment of moral blameworthiness, the
mens rea must usually be at least gross negligence or recklessness, not
the simple negligence used in the tort system to determine who pays
whom.19 At the same time, evil intent is not required for criminal
12. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 311 (4th ed. 2003). For exceptions, see infra text
accompanying notes 13-16.
13. Id. at 310-11. See also, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3)(b) (1962) ("Liability for the
commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless: ... a duty
to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.").
14. LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 312-16. See also, People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129
(Mich. 1907).
15. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. 1971).
16. LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 797-98 (citing cases and stating that "[mlanslaughter liability has
not infrequently been based upon criminal negligence or recklessness in omitting to act.").
17. Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d.334, 340 (Cal. 1976).
18. PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 146 (1st ed. 2005)
("The requirement of culpability distinguishes criminal law from other bodies of law.").
19. LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 264-67.
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liability. To be guilty of manslaughter, for instance, one need not intend
death to occur. An awareness that one's act, or failure to act, carries a
substantial risk of death will suffice, and in some jurisdictions, the
prosecution need only show that the defendant should have known that
the failure created a significant potential for death.20 Furthermore, a risk
might be considered "substantial" even if it is below 50%.21
Now imagine Dr. Careful, a psychiatrist whose patient, Sam, has just
confided in her that he plans to kill his girlfriend. Under the modem
version of Tarasoff liability, once that threat occurs, Dr. Careful
presumptively has a duty to take steps reasonably calculated to prevent
the threat from being carried out. Those steps might include committing
or in some other way aggressively treating Sam, calling the police or
warning the girlfriend.22 If Dr. Careful does not take one of these steps,
and Sam kills his girlfriend, the doctor may be liable in tort.
The important point for present purposes, however, is that Dr. Careful
may also be liable under criminal law for the crime of manslaughter. A
breach of her Tarasoff duty would establish the criminal actus reus. And
if she knew or should have known that failing to act created a substantial
risk of the girlfriend's death-both of which are likely if a serious threat
is made-a manslaughter conviction would be appropriate. In the
alternative, Dr. Careful might be criminally liable for Sam's homicide
on a complicity theory of liability. Under the Model Penal Code, a
person is an accomplice to manslaughter if he or she purposely fails to
perform a duty (which is true of Dr. Careful if she does not take the
Tarasoff steps) and is aware of a substantial risk that the failure to
perform this duty will lead to death of another.23 Under the Code, this
complicity liability for Sam's act would exist even if Sam is eventually
found not guilty (because, for instance, he was insane at the time he
20. Id. at 794-95; MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(c) & (d) (1962) (stating that recklessness
exists when a person "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk" and negligence exists
when a person "should be aware" of such a risk).
21. See also, People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 217 (Colo. 2000) (quoting People v. Deskins, 927
P.2d 368, 373 (Colo. 1996), which held that "[a] risk does not have to be 'more likely than not to occur'
or 'probable' in order to be substantial ... Some risks may be substantial even if they carry a low degree
of probability because the magnitude of the harm is potentially great").
22. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340 (listing options).
23. The Model Penal Code states that complicity exists when the person (I) has the "purpose
of... facilitating ... the offense"; (2) has a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense and fails
to make proper effort to do so; and (3) with respect to result crimes like homicide, has the mens rea for
the relevant result (e.g., recklessness, if the charge is manslaughter). MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.06(3) &
(4) (1962). Although criterion (1) would seem to foreclose complicity liability for clinicians in a
Tarasoff scenario, the Code's commentary makes clear that it merely requires the accomplice to intend
the omission, not the ultimate result caused by the principal, the mens rea for which is established by the
relevant crime pursuant to criterion (3). Id.
2006] 649
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killed his girlfriend).24
Of course, Dr. Careful may have one or more defenses to these
charges, similar to those that could be raised in a tort case. First, she
might argue that she could not take appropriate preventive steps
because, for instance, there was insufficient time to do so, or because
doing so would have put her in danger. Second, consistent with the
Tarasoff duty in many jurisdictions,25 criminal liability might not exist if
the girlfriend already knew of Sam's violent hostility toward her, thus
arguably obviating the need to protect her.
26
A more likely argument on Dr. Careful's behalf would be that she
lacked the relevant mens rea; to wit, she could contend that, despite
Sam's threat, she did not think the girlfriend was in sufficient danger to
require any special action on her part. Perhaps Sam had made such
threats before and they amounted to nothing, or perhaps he made this
one in a blustery or half-hearted manner that signaled a lack of
motivation to carry through with the act. In many jurisdictions, she
would only have to show she honestly believed these facts (i.e., that she
was non-reckless); in others she would also have to show that the beliefs
were reasonable (i.e., that she was not criminally negligent).27
Less credibly, Dr. Careful might argue that ignoring the risk that Sam
presented was justifiable.28 Specifically, she might contend that even if
Sam represented a substantial risk to his girlfriend, she believed that the
usual methods of managing that risk carried an even greater probability
of substantial harm. For instance, Dr. Careful might assert that, while
she believed there was a 30% chance that Sam would kill if no
preventive steps were taken, she foresaw an 60% chance that the loss of
liberty, stigma and coerced treatment associated with commitment
would only worsen Sam's condition, and a 50% chance that exposing his
threats to police or his girlfriend would make him more homicidal
because he would be unwilling to seek help from therapists again.29
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(7) (1962).
25. See Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 19-25, 30-32.
26. See LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 799 (the victim's conduct "is a factor to be considered in
determining whether the defendant's conduct, under all the circumstances, amounted to criminal
negligence.").
27. See ROBINSON, supra note 18, at 639.
28. The Model Penal Code explicitly makes this part of the inquiry into recklessness and
negligence. See supra note 20.
29. The government might argue, in response, that Dr. Careful should have realized that non-
disclosure might also lead to commitment and loss of confidentiality if Sam hurt his girlfriend and
prosecution ensued. Seldom recognized by those who oppose Tarasoff out of concern about
confidentiality is that, if the threatened harm does occur, the revelation of private information is likely to
be much more extensive than would occur through a simple warning disclosing only those facts
necessary to prevent the harm.
650
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If she is unsuccessful with these defenses, a final contention would be
that her breach of the duty was not the proximate cause of the
girlfriend's death. Sam clearly is a so-called "intervening" cause. 30 Yet
Tarasoff rejected this lack-of-causation argument as a matter of tort
law.3 1  And although criminal law's causation requirements are
theoretically more stringent, 32 if Sam's act was easily foreseeable in the
absence of preventive action, then Dr. Careful's breach of the Tarasoff
duty will probably be sufficient cause for punishment purposes as well.
Recall that parents have been found criminally liable for harm caused by
their children and employers for harm caused by their employees despite
similarly attenuated causation.
33
As this discussion illustrates, criminal liability, like civil liability,
rests largely on an evaluation of mental health professionals'
assessments of risk. A number of the articles in this symposium discuss
this issue from an empirical perspective. 34  Here, it will be examined
only from the perspective of the criminal law, which has other
interesting implications for Tarasoff
II. THE CRIMINAL LAW AND DANGEROUSNESS
Criminal punishment is generally imposed for a past harm, like
homicide, rape, theft or fraud. But it is also routinely imposed on
"dangerous" people who caused no harm. For instance, the inchoate
crimes of attempt and conspiracy do not require a completed act, nor do
crimes such as reckless endangerment.
35
The criminal law does not use actuarial tables or clinical risk factors
to determine whether persons charged with these crimes would have
30. See Weathers v. Pilkinton, 754 S.W.2d 75, 78-79 (Tenn. 1988) (holding that a suicide by
patient is an intervening event absolving a negligent therapist from liability unless the patient "did not
know the nature or consequences of his act").
31. Actually, Tarasoff did not address the causation issue directly, but its holding that therapists
could be liable for the acts of their patients indicates that the intervening cause defense is not available.
See Winger v. Franciscan Med. Ctr., 701 N.E.2d 813, 819 (II1. App. Ct. 1998) (holding, contrary to
Weathers, that a therapist can be liable for the acts of a patient even when the patient is not "bereft of
reason" at the time of the act).
32. See, e.g., Commonwealth. v. Rementer, 598 A.2d 1300, 1306 (Pa. 1991) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Howard, 402 A.2d 674, 676 (Pa. 1979)) ("Our cases emphasize that a criminal
conviction requires 'a more direct causal connection' than tort concepts .... Thus not only do we
demand that the defendant's conduct actually cause the victim's death ... we also question ... whether
the fatal result was so extraordinary, remote or attenuated that it would be unfair to hold the defendant
criminally responsible for it.").
33. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., infra note 45.
35. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (attempt), § 5.03 (conspiracy), § 211.2 (reckless
endangerment) (1962).
2006]
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carried them out. Rather it relies on a number of common sense
mechanisms. In defining the mens rea for these types of crimes,
criminal law doctrine usually requires proof of an intent to cause the
harm or at least knowledge on the part of the actor that he or she has
done everything that needs to be done to cause the harm (which fails to
occur only because of the victim's luck, police competence, or some
other unforeseen event).36 In defining the actus reus for inchoate crimes,
criminal law usually requires a substantial step toward commission of a
completed harm. For instance, conspiracy requires an agreement
between two people to commit the crime, and in many jurisdictions it
also requires proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.37 An
attempt occurs only when the individual engages in conduct beyond
''mere preparation" that evidences dangerous proximity to commission
of a crime. 38 Reckless endangerment requires engaging in conduct that
places or may place another person in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury.39
Note that modem Tarasoff doctrine contemplates only the first of
these two elements. While a patient's expression of an intent to cause
harm is necessary to trigger Tarasoff analysis, it is also sufficient.
Inchoate crimes normally require, in addition, some sort of overt act or
conduct. Thus, Sam could not be prosecuted merely for his threat.40 To
convict him of attempt, there would also have to be proof that he took a
substantial step toward carrying the threat out, such as buying a gun,
setting up an appointment with the girlfriend, or developing a plan for
the killing. A conviction for reckless endangerment would require that
the harm be even more imminent.41
Perhaps Tarasoff analysis should take into account the criminal law's
approach to dangerousness assessments. If it did, a therapist would be
liable only if he or she both witnessed a direct threat and became aware
36. See LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 628-31 (describing mens rea for conspiracy, which usually
requires intent to achieve the objective); see id. at 583-87 (describing mens rea for attempt, which
usually requires intent to complete the crime, but might only require intent to engage in conduct which
one is aware or should be aware will cause harm).
37. Id. at 622-28 (describing actus reus for conspiracy).
38. Id. at 588-96 (describing actus reus for attempt).
39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1962).
40. Certain types of threats, not applicable here, may be a crime. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 211.3 (1962) (criminalizing threats meant to "terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building");
18 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2006) (threatening to assault an immediate family member of a U.S. official).
41. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1962) (stating that "[r]ecklessness and danger shall
be presumed where a person knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another"); State v.
Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762, 771 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-103(a) (2000)
requiring that "death" or "serious bodily injury" be "imminent" to sustain a conviction for reckless
endangerment).
652
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of a substantial step toward carrying it out. That second requirement
could prove crucial, since a jury that knows that a person has been killed
or suffered serious injury will probably find incredible, however true it
might be, the assertion that a patient's threat to harm that person did not
represent a substantial risk.42 The converse of this point is that criminal
liability for a breach of the Tarasoff duty as it is presently defined is, in
theory at least, highly likely.
Ill. IMPLICATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINE FOR TARASOFF
These observations about the criminal liability created by recognition
of a Tarasoff duty, if accepted, could trigger at least three possible
reactions. The first is the conclusion that we should get rid of Tarasoff
If that doctrine can be used as a springboard for putting mental health
professionals in prison, then, some might reason, it should be jettisoned.
Others might be willing to contemplate criminal liability for failing to
prevent harm under tightly limited circumstances that evidence clear
blameworthiness on the part of the clinician. Thus, a second reaction to
the above discussion might be an attempt to limit Tarasoff in a manner
that conforms to criminal law principles. Specifically, civil liability, and
therefore criminal liability, might require that the mental health
professional not only hear the patient issue a serious threat against a
specified victim but also that the clinician observe, or in some other way
find out, that the patient has taken a substantial step toward carrying it
out.
A third reaction to the foregoing observations, which focuses on the
manner of fulfilling the Tarasoff duty rather than on when it is triggered,
is more complicated. It begins with an analysis of why mental health
professionals have been saddled with a duty to prevent violent harm
while other groups-including medical doctors, lawyers, teachers and
ordinary citizens-have not. According to Tarasoff the duty it
announced exists because mental health professionals have a "special
relationship" not only with their patients but also with the third parties
their patients might harm.43 The latter relationship apparently stems
from clinicians' knowledge of their patients' violent propensities and the
42. In practice, even in those jurisdictions that require proof of recklessness (which contemplates
a subjective awareness of the risk) criminal liability for violent acts the therapist did not take steps to
prevent is likely to depend, as it does with civil liability, on whether the mental health professional
should have foreseen those acts. See LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 269 ("Whether or not the defendant was
consciously aware of the risk or simply failed to be aware is often a close question.").
43. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d.334, 343-44 (Cal. 1976).
(finding a special relationship between doctor and patient); see id. at 349 (refusing to find such a
relationship between police and patient).
20061 653
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clinicians' ability to do something about them. In other words, the
California Supreme Court's assumption in Tarasoff seemed to be that,
because clinicians get to know their patients and are trained in
prognostication and treatment, they can justly be required to prevent
those patients from harming others.44
That assumption does usefully distinguish mental health professionals
from others to the extent the Tarasoff duty depends upon an ability to
predict dangerousness and an ability to treat it. Although mental health
professionals are not particularly good at foreseeing violence, those
trained in modem risk assessment techniques are undoubtedly better
than any other group at that task.45 And, compared to laypeople,
psychiatrists and psychologists are clearly superior at treating aggressive
individuals, 46 and better equipped, both professionally and legally, to
initiate civil commitment proceedings when appropriate.
47
If, however, the Tarasoff duty is triggered solely by a serious threat of
physical violence toward an identifiable victim, which is the law today
in most jurisdictions that follow Tarasoff,48 and if discharge of the duty
can include a warning to the victim or the police, again something
contemplated by current law, then the distinction between mental health
professionals and others begins to disappear. Neither by training nor
skill are mental health professionals necessarily more adept than anyone
else at discerning when a specific threat has been made, especially if, as
suggested above, a threat is defined as "serious" only if a significant step
toward carrying it out occurs. Indeed, we routinely assume that ordinary
citizens sitting on juries in attempt cases can make such determinations;
even in Tarasoff suits, courts have held that juries do not need the help
44. Id. at 345-46.
45. Some research suggests that mental health professionals who use clinical prediction
techniques are no better than laypeople at assessing risk. Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of
Violence: Being Accurate about Accuracy, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 783, 790
(1994). However, laypeople cannot replicate the accuracy of mental health professionals trained to use
actuarial devices or instruments such as the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, Iterative Classification
Trees, or the HCR-20. See generally Monahan, Tarasoff at Thirty: How Developments in Science and
Policy Shape the Common Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 497 (2006).
46. See generally CLINICAL TREATMENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON (Loren Roth ed., 1987).
47. Although many states permit individuals other than mental health professionals to initiate a
commitment proceeding or an emergency detention, virtually all also require that the petition be
supported by clinical opinion on issues such as the existence of mental disorder and dangerousness. See,
e.g., CAL. CODE §§ 5150.05, 5150.3; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.37, 9.39 (McKinney 2006); FLA.
STAT. § 394.463(2)(a) (2006). The fact that detention of a person who is not "insane" can result in a
false imprisonment or assault and battery action provides further incentive to involve mental health
professionals in the decision as soon as possible. D.A. Cox, Annotation Right, Without Judicial
Proceeding, to Arrest and Detain One Who is, or is Suspected of Being, Mentally Deranged, 92
A.L.R.2d 570 § 2 (1963).
48. See supra note 4.
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of experts to determine whether violation of the duty to act after a threat
has occurred.49  And it is obvious that laypeople are just as able as
clinicians at alerting the police or the potential victim when such a threat
occurs. To the extent that Tarasoff requires mental health professionals
to provide warnings when they hear a serious threat aimed at an
identifiable victim, it logically should require laypeople to do so as well.
The argument for such a duty may even be stronger with respect to some
groups such as teachers and ordinary citizens, given that they are not
restricted by confidentiality rules from making disclosures.
Far from countering this conclusion, the precedent that Tarasoff cited
in support of its decision imposing a special duty on mental health
professionals actually bolsters the argument that these individuals are
not distinguishable from others when the issue is whether police or
potential victims should be alerted about a serious threat. The California
Supreme Court relied on two lines of cases in justifying its holding that
mental health professionals have a special relationship with their
patients' potential victims. First, it pointed to decisions in which a
treating facility was found liable for negligent release of a patient.5°
Second, it cited cases where doctors were found liable for failing to
warn a patient's family that he or she suffered from a contagious
disease. 51  In both of these situations, clinicians are acting on their
special knowledge and authority. Releasing someone from a treatment
program prematurely or without proper aftercare precautions is a bad
treatment decision, and one which only the treating entity has sufficient
information and proper authority to make. And doctors alone have the
expertise and access necessary to ascertain whether someone is
contagious, a condition which only a doctor can treat or protect against
through quarantine, actual or constructive (through giving potential
victims a warning). In contrast, anyone, doctor or layperson, who hears
one person issue a serious threat toward another has the ability to
49. In Ewing v. Northridge Hosp. Med. Ctr., 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 591, 601-02 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004),
the court held:
By enacting section 43.92 [the Tarasoff statute], the Legislature intended to limit a
psychotherapist's liability for failure to warn to instances in which the therapist actually
believed or predicted that the patient posed a serious threat of inflicting grave bodily
injury. The mind-set of a therapist can be evaluated by resort to common knowledge
without the aid of expert testimony .... 'Liability is not based on a breach of the standard
of care but rather the specific duty to warn which arises from communication of a threat.'
Id.
50. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d.334, 344 (Cal. 1976).
(citing Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. United States, 272 F.Supp. 409 (D.ND. 1967),
which found a hospital liable for failing to tell an aftercare volunteer about a patient's violent
propensities).
51. Id. at 344.
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understand it and alert the appropriate parties. Again, laypeople are in
the same position as clinicians to the extent the Tarasoff duty is framed
as an obligation to wam when a serious threat to an identifiable victim is
issued.
If that is so, then given the close relationship between civil and
criminal law noted earlier, laypeople, not just clinicians, can be liable
criminally, not just civilly, when they fail to warn of a specific serious
threat. Yet that outcome, most agree, would take things too far. Under
the common law of crimes, misprision of a felony was a crime itself.
52
But even under the common law, this crime generally applied only to
failure to report a completed felony; as one commentator who recently
examined the relevant cases put it,
with one exception, in all cases in which the facts are described, the
prosecution for misprision of a felony has never proceeded against a
defendant for his or her failure to stop a felony or arrest a felon; and
contemporary American authorities acknowledge that the duty imposed
by the offense is limited to disclosure of knowledge.
53
Today most states do not even criminalize breach of the latter duty.
54
This reluctance to impose a duty to prevent, and in most states even to
report, crime is based on a number of considerations. A Florida court
rejected adoption of the crime of misprision of felony in these words:
While it may be desirable, even essential, that we encourage citizens to
"get involved" to help reduce crime, they ought not be adjudicated
criminals themselves if they don't. The fear of such a consequence is a
fear from which our traditional concepts of peace and quietude guarantee
freedom. We cherish the right to mind our own business when our own
best interests dictate. Accordingly, we hold that misprision of felony has
not been adopted into, and is not a part of, Florida substantive law.5
5
The federal code does recognize the crime of misprision, but only if the
prosecution shows an affirmative act of concealment, as when the
individual refuses to talk to, or lies to, the police about the underlying
52. LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 713.
53. Gabriel D. M. Ciociola, Misprision of Felony and Its Progeny, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 697, 700-
01 (2003). Most jurisdictions also refuse to impose civil liability for a failure to prevent harm. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314. Indeed, even a "doctor may flout his Hippocratic oath and
deny aid to a stranger." JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 144 (5th ed. 1977).
54. LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 713 (Misprision of felony is "no longer an offense in most
jurisdictions"). Note that the absence of such a crime would not get clinicians in Tarasoffstates off the
hook, since they have an independent duty to protect.
55. Holland v. State, 302 So.2d 806, 810 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974). See also, William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Findors, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of
Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978).
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felony. 56 Finally, even in those jurisdictions that make failing to report a
crime, such a failure is usually only a misdemeanor, not the serious
crime it would be if based on a breach of Tarasoff and the ensuing
crime.5
7
Warnings to the police or the victim should be a legally required
option for mental health professionals only if we are willing to require
non-clinicians to exercise the same options when they are confronted
with specific threats. Since we apparently are not willing to do so, the
end result of this reasoning is that Tarasoff should only impose a duty on
mental health professionals to handle dangerous patients through
avenues that are not easily available to laypeople: outpatient therapy or
involuntary commitment.
In short, viewed through the prism of criminal law, Tarasoff should
be recast as a duty to treat dangerousness, not prevent harm in any way
possible. This duty to treat derives from the most obvious distinction
between mental health professionals and others: their ability to deal with
psychological and relational problems, and their authority, if they cannot
deal with those problems, to commit patients involuntarily. The ability
to treat comes from mental health professionals' training and experience.
Ultimately, so does their authority to commit. Although in many
jurisdictions "any person" can petition for commitment, in practice and
in law the onus falls on mental health professionals to support the case
for involuntary hospitalization.5 8 Laypeople, if they have any role at all,
have no real power in this setting.
59
IV. THE IMPACT OF A DUTY TO TREAT
This reconceptualization of Tarasoff as a duty to treat has several
consequences, all of which are probably advantages. As already noted,
the proposed reconceptualization prevents expansion of Tarasoff
56. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). See also United States v. Farrar, 38 F.2d 515, 517 (D. Mass. 1930)
("Mere silence after knowledge of the commission of the crime is not sufficient.").
57. At common law, misprision of felony was a misdemeanor, although under federal law it can
be a felony. Ciociola, supra note 53, at 722 n.150. States that have retained misprision and modem
failure-to-report statutes make the crime a misdemeanor. Id. at 726-28, 731-33.
58. See supra note 47.
59. One commentator has argued that criminal defense attorneys have a Tarasoff duty to seek
commitment for clients who evidence dangerousness because, compared to the typical citizen, they have
greater knowledge of criminal behavior and greater professional stature, both of which enhance the
likelihood their allegations will provide probable cause to believe that detention in a mental hospital is
necessary. Michael A. Backstrom, Unveiling the Truth When It Matters Most: Implementing the
Tarasoff Duty for California's Lawyers, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 139, 163-65 (1999). But, as the author
admits, "lawyers cannot independently order commitment," and no receiving facility is likely to detain
an individual simply because a lawyer asserts that it should. Id. at 164.
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liability outside of the mental health professions. Second, it simplifies
the clinician's decision-making in specific threat situations by narrowing
the options to outpatient treatment or inpatient treatment, options which
are also probably the most effective (since, as many have pointed out,
alerting the police or the victim simply passes the buck to them).6 °
Third, if confidentiality is breached it will be breached only in a civil
commitment hearing, which usually will mean less exposure of private
information to the outside world than occurs under a warnings regime.
Fourth, hard decisions can be turned over to a judge, whose ruling will
immunize the clinician from liability.
This last consequence may strike some as a disadvantage because it
could create a temptation to treat every threat as grounds for a
commitment petition. Indeed, in the law review article that allegedly
spurred the Tarasoff decision,61 Fleming and Maximov strongly implied
that a duty to warn is necessary to prevent overuse of civil
commitment,62 which they believed to be "constitutionally suspect"
because of its "drastic" psychological and practical consequences and its
similarity to punishment. 63  But much has changed in the past thirty
years. Commitment no longer consists of long-term incarceration in ill-
kept warehouses masquerading as hospitals. 64 The average duration of
involuntary hospitalization for those who are dangerous to others is
probably well under a month, usually followed by outpatient treatment.65
A warning is still less of a restriction on liberty than commitment but is
substantially less so than it was three decades ago.
More importantly, Fleming and Maximov's suggestion that warning
the threatened victim could somehow supercede commitment as the
primary means of handling a mentally ill and dangerous patient never
made much sense. If a patient is considered dangerous, most clinicians
60. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 2, at 374. This formulation also is more closely aligned to the
precedent, on which Tarasoffrelied, holding hospitals liable for premature release of dangerous patients.
See Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of Califomia, 551 P.2d. 334, 343 (Cal. 1976).
61. See Stone, supra note 2, at 361.
62, John G. Fleming & Bruce Maximov, Note, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's
Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1025, 1065-66 (1974) (listing the therapist's options and concluding that
"action more drastic than necessary to afford reasonable protection for the third party subjects the
patient to unwarranted invasion of his rights").
63. Id. at 1051-55.
64. Paul F. Stavis, Foreword. First Annual Forum on Mental Illness and the Law, 11 GEO.
MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 1, 12 (2000) ("With few exceptions, the large and long-term psychiatric
hospital has gone the way of the dinosaur.").
65. RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS 814 (2004) (reporting statistics of average hospital stays for all patients, including those who
are chronically unable to care for themselves and not easily treatable in the community, between 41 and
90 days).
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will opt for commitment over a warning.66 And, even if they do choose
the latter option, it is unlikely to function either as an effective
alternative to commitment or as a less restrictive one. Potential victims
who are told they are a target will either do nothing, out of fear, fatalism
or disbelief, or they will demand that the therapist or police take some
action, which in most cases will be the commitment that Fleming and
Maximov wanted to avoid.
The one situation in which options other than commitment are useful,
a situation that is admittedly likely to be fairly common, is when the
patient is dangerous but not mentally disordered, and thus not
committable. Again, however, unless we want to make laypeople liable
for failure to alert the police or to warn the potential victim in such
situations, we should also avoid imposing that duty on mental health
professionals. At the same time, the rule proposed above would still
impose on the mental health professional a duty to treat a non-
committable dangerous patient to try to prevent the harm. That
treatment might include "talking the patient down, 67 reminding the
patient of the consequences of crime (and perhaps also mentioning that
the therapist may have to reveal threats and other indicia of homicidal
motivation in any subsequent prosecution 68), or having the patient meet
with the threatened victim to work out problems.69 If these types of
steps are not taken, liability, both civil and criminal, might still attach.
Furthermore, clinicians could still be permitted to disclose
information necessary to prevent harm under limited circumstances. For
instance, Florida law provides that, "[w]hen a patient has declared an
intention to harm other persons," the clinician may release "sufficient
information to provide adequate warning to the person threatened with
harm by the patient., 70 The ethical rules governing lawyers endorse the
same concept. According to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
66. Buckner & Firestone, supra note 10, at 220 (after summarizing the relevant empirical data,
concluding that "the mechanisms recommended in protective statutes-waming the victim and police-are
rarely utilized in favor of hospitalization.").
67. Robert Schopp & David Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due Care:
Psychotherapists and Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 163, 177 (1989)
(describing case in which the therapist "believes from past experience with [the patient] that she can best
serve his interests and those of the public by maintaining therapeutic contact, calming him down, and
talking him into leaving the weapon at home...").
68. Cf United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 579 (6th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a "dangerous
patient" exception to the psychotherapist patient privilege), with Guerrier v. State, 811 So.2d 852, 856
(Fl. Ct. App. 2002) (adopting the exception).
69. See Damon Muir Walcott et al., Current Analysis of the Tarasoff Duty: An Evolution
Towards the Limitation of the Duty to Protect, 19 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 325, 340 (2001) (suggesting this
approach).
70. FL. STAT. § 394.4615(3)(a) (2006).
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"a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary .. to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.",7' The
important difference between these provisions and Tarasoff is that the
former make disclosure discretionary, rather than mandatory. Under this
regime, clinicians and lawyers who believe that admonitions about
potential Tarasoff actions are off-putting would also have more
flexibility as to whether and how to provide that information under
informed consent rules.72
CONCLUSION
This examination of Tarasoff through the prism of criminal law can
be reduced to a few simple points. Tarasoff liability might mean
criminal liability as well, perhaps even for manslaughter in cases in
which the patient kills someone. If we want to mitigate that effect, we
might take a cue from the criminal law's treatment of dangerousness as a
basis for punishment, and require that the therapist be aware not only of
a threat aimed a specific victim-the typical modem Tarasoff
formulation-but also of conduct aimed at carrying out that threat that
cannot justifiably be ignored. To avoid the possibility that Tarasoff will
be interpreted to impose civil or criminal liability on laypeople, we
might also eliminate the clinician's duty to take any preventive steps
other than those aimed at doing what only clinicians are expert at
doing-treating dangerousness. So limited, Tarasoff would require
clinicians to breach confidentiality only when a dangerous patient is
committable and not otherwise treatable.
In one of the papers for this symposium, Professors Buel and Drew
argue that lawyers should have a tort duty to wam about harm threatened
by their clients (at least in domestic violence situations) and thus, by
implication, that mental health professionals should have an analogous
duty.73 Indeed, Buel and Drew's view is that a warning is such simple
step, and can be so effective at preventing significant harm, that
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2003).
72. Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, Specialty Guidelines for
Forensic Psychologists, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 660 (1991) ("Forensic psychologists inform their
clients of the limitations to the confidentiality of their services and their products ... by providing them
with an understandable statement of their rights, privileges, and the limitations of confidentiality.");
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2003) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.").
73. Sara Buel & Margaret Drew, Do Ask and Do Tell: Rethinking the Lawyer's Duty to Warn in
Domestic Abuse Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 447 (2006).
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concerns about confidentiality and agency can never trump this duty.74
Nor are they satisfied with an ethical, as opposed to tort, remedy,7 5 along
the lines of those few states ethics codes that require disclosure of client
communications if necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm.76
For reasons developed in this article, their logic also supports imposing a
duty to warn on anyone confronted with a direct threat toward a battered
individual, as well as on police, doctors and others who do not hear a
direct threat but, like lawyers, can be charged with knowledge about the
dynamics of domestic violence, a duty that could be backed up by
criminal liability.
Maybe that should be the law; certainly when domestic harm occurs
there is a strong urge to blame those who might have been able to
prevent it. But, for reasons suggested by the original opponents of
Tarasoff and summarized in the introduction to this article, reinstating
the common law version of misprision of felony or its tort equivalent
will not necessarily reduce overall harm, could significantly chill
professional practices, and might damage relationships between the
warners and their patients, clients or friends. I am ultimately undecided
on the best course to take. Thirty years after Tarasoff the jury is still
out as to how to best prevent the public peril posed by threatening
individuals.
74- Id.
75 Id.
76. See, e.g., FL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b) (2006).
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